For quick reference, the table below summarizes Turkey’s principal demographic and economic indicators in the mid-2020s. The data come from official Turkish sources (TurkStat) and international databases (World Bank, CIA World Factbook):
| Indicator | Value | Year | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total population | 85,372,377 | 2023 | TurkStat |
| Population growth rate | 0.11% | 2023 | TurkStat |
| Median age | 34.0 years | 2023 | TurkStat |
| Life expectancy at birth | 78.5 years | 2024 | World Bank |
| GDP (nominal) | $1.32 trillion | 2024 | World Bank |
| Population of largest city (Istanbul) | 15,848,000 | 2023 | CIA World Factbook |
| Urban population share | 77.5% | 2023 | CIA World Factbook |
These figures paint a concise picture: Turkey is a nation of roughly 85–87 million people today (the precise count in 2024/2025 is about 85.5 million), with a median age in the mid-30s and life expectancy in the high 70s. The economy is substantial (OECD, G20), but social indicators reflect a country in transition: near-universal literacy and schooling, a youthful (but aging) population structure, and rapid urbanization.
Our analysis relies heavily on Turkey’s official statistics. The Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) maintains the primary data on population, education, employment and related indicators. Since 2007, TurkStat has used an Address-Based Population Registration System (ABPRS) to perform an annual population count by registering individuals at their official residences. This system provides updated population totals each year (rather than a traditional decennial census). According to TurkStat, the population was 85,372,377 as of end-2023, which is the benchmark for most recent demographic estimates. TurkStat also publishes educational attainment, labor force statistics and other social data through surveys and administrative records.
It is important to note that TurkStat does not collect data on ethnicity or religion in its population registry. Estimates of ethnic composition (e.g. percent Kurdish, Circassian, etc.) are drawn from academic and NGO studies, minority organizations, or international sources like the CIA Factbook, since official figures do not include such breakdowns. Similarly, figures on internal and international migration, while tracked, may have gaps (e.g. not all refugees are in official registers). In the discussion below we will use TurkStat data (and internationally comparable statistics) as the backbone of factual claims, supplementing with academic or media sources for topics like ethnic makeup and social trends where direct census data is absent.
Turkey’s population has expanded dramatically since the early 20th century. In 1927 (the first republican census) the count was only about 13 million. By 1950 it had reached roughly 20 million; by 2000 it was about 65 million; and by 2020 it exceeded 84 million. This growth was fueled by historically high fertility rates and improvements in health. Over recent decades, however, the rate of increase has steadily slowed. Today the population is approximately 85.4 million (2023). According to official data, Turkey’s annual population growth rate fell to 0.11% in 2023 (that is, about a +92,800 increase in a year on a base of 85.28M in 2022). In other words, Turkey is essentially no longer experiencing the rapid boom of mid-century; instead, growth is extremely modest.
As of the end of 2023, TurkStat reports Turkey’s population as 85,372,377. The gender balance is virtually even: about 50.1% male (42.73M) and 49.9% female (42.64M). The slight surplus of men (overall sex ratio ≈1.01 males per female) is consistent with other countries at similar demographic stages.
The annual growth rate is now near zero compared to the high rates of the past. In 2023 the population grew by only about 0.11% (1.1 per thousand). (For context, that was down from 0.7% in 2022.) In absolute terms, the net increase in 2023 was just +92,824 people. By comparison, a decade earlier Turkey was adding over half a million people per year.
The slowdown reflects plunging birth rates and relatively stable mortality: Turkey’s crude birth rate is now only ~11.2 births per 1,000 population (2023), nearly half its level in the early 2000s. Correspondingly, the total fertility rate (TFR) has fallen below replacement: it was around 2.38 children per woman in 2001 and dropped to about 1.51 in 2023. In short, Turkish families are having far fewer children than in the past, mirroring a global trend in developed and middle-income countries. This has major implications for future population size (see next section).
The deceleration of growth is a long-term story. In the late 20th century, Turkey’s population growth rate frequently exceeded 2% per year. For example, in 1980 the growth rate was about 2.0% (over 850,000 added per year), reflecting a TFR above 4.5 back then. By the mid-1990s the TFR had dropped to the mid-3s, and growth was around 1.7%. Entering the 21st century, fertility fell into the 2–2.5 range and growth hovered around 1–1.5% annually. Only in the 2010s did fertility slide to the 1.6–1.8 range; growth fell below 1%. By 2022 and 2023, Turkey’s annual growth hit its lowest point, reflecting a TFR near 1.5 and nearly replacement-level population size.
This transition has already brought the country into what demographers call Stage 4 of the demographic transition (low birth and death rates). With births down roughly 50% since 2001, Turkey’s population is aging, its labor pool is stabilizing, and the era of “demographic dividends” (a large youth population driving growth) is ending.
The term “birth rate” can mean different things, so we clarify: Turkey’s crude birth rate (annual births per 1,000 people) in 2023 was about 11.2. In more telling terms, the total fertility rate (TFR) — the average number of children a woman will have in her lifetime — has fallen to roughly 1.5 children per woman in 2023. This is well below the replacement level of about 2.1. By comparison, in 2001 Turkey’s TFR was around 2.38, and the crude birth rate was roughly 20.3 per 1,000. The sharp decline is due to factors like urbanization, higher education among women, economic changes, and family planning policies. In short, Turkish families today are having fewer children than in previous generations, a key reason why population growth has slowed.
Looking ahead, virtually all demographic projections foresee Turkey’s population continuing to age and eventually declining. Official projections (by TurkStat, based on 2022–2023 data) indicate that under a “medium fertility” scenario, Turkey’s population will still grow modestly for a few more decades and peak around the mid-21st century, then gradually fall. For example, TurkStat’s baseline forecast shows the population rising to about 88.2 million by 2030 and roughly 93.8 million by 2050, before turning downward to below 77 million by 2100. (In other words, the model projects slow growth now, a plateau or peak around 2045–2050, then decades of decline.)
Different scenarios give quite different long-term outcomes. A low-fertility scenario (if birth rates drop even faster) predicts an earlier peak near 90 million in the mid-2040s and a steep fall to only about 55 million by 2100. A high-fertility scenario (if birth rates rise slightly or decline more slowly) could see the population exceed 100 million by the 2050s and remain high through the century. At present, however, most analysts consider the medium projection more likely, implying a peak population in the 2050s followed by a gradual decline. In sum, Turkey’s long-term trajectory is a turning point: from sustained growth to a future of stabilization and decrease. This will reshape many aspects of society and economy in the late 21st century.
Currently, Turkey’s population is still growing (albeit very slowly: about 0.11% in 2023). Long term, virtually all credible forecasts indicate the growth will stop. As fertility remains below replacement and life expectancy stabilizes, the population is expected to peak and then shrink. In TurkStat’s projection, the peak occurs around mid-century (mid-2040s to 2050) and afterward the population contracts. Even the United Nations’ projections (2022 Revision) show a similar pattern: small growth continuing for a few decades, then decline as deaths exceed births. In practical terms, Turkey’s total population will likely begin to decrease (year-over-year) in the latter half of the 21st century.
As noted, under the medium-growth scenario the peak is about 93.8 million around 2050. After that, the population would fall back below today’s level. For example, TurkStat data suggest:
Under the low-fertility scenario, the peak is lower (~90 million in the 2040s) with a sharp fall to roughly 55 million by 2100. The high-fertility scenario could push the peak above 100 million by the 2050s. Given current trends, the main takeaway is that Turkey will likely see minimal net population gain by mid-century, and potentially decline substantially by 2100 as birth rates remain low.
Turkey’s age structure is transitioning from the classic pyramid shape of a youthful society to a more rectangular (or even inverted) shape of an aging society. In 2023, about 22.1% of Turks are under age 15, 68.6% are between 15 and 64, and only 9.3% are 65 or older. (For comparison, in 2000 roughly 28% were under 15 and 6% were over 65.) Thus the child population share is steadily shrinking while the elderly share grows.
These numbers can be visualized in the national population pyramid, which over recent decades has been losing its wide base of children. Young cohorts have become thinner (due to falling birth rates), and the top of the pyramid is bulging outward as people survive longer. The result is a more top-heavy profile: a relatively large working-age population today, but a growing elderly population to support in the future.
If plotted, Turkey’s age pyramid for 2023 would show narrower bars at the bottom than in previous decades, and wider bars in the middle and upper ranges. Children (0–14) make up only 22% of the population. By contrast, those aged 15–64 form nearly 69%, and seniors 65+ about 9%. Even the working-age group is graying: half of the population is now over about 33 years old (the median age). This shift is characteristic of countries in late demographic transition.
One useful summary is the dependency ratio. In 2023 the total dependency ratio (the sum of youth and elderly population relative to the working-age population) was about 49%, meaning there were roughly 49 dependents (children and retirees) for every 100 working-age adults. A decade ago, the total dependency was higher (more children but fewer elderly) – but importantly the share of elderly dependents has been rising. The elderly dependency ratio (65+ vs. 15–64) is about 12.3%, up from under 10% ten years earlier. Meanwhile the youth dependency ratio (0–14 vs. 15–64) has been falling (about 34.5% now). This means the “demographic bonus” era (when many workers support relatively few dependents) is ending, and pressures from an older population will increase in coming decades.
The median age of Turkey’s population is the age which divides the population into two numerically equal groups. According to recent estimates, the median age is about 33.6 years (in 2023). This is a few years higher than it was a decade ago (~30 years around 2012) and reflects the low birth rate. The rising median age is a clear signal of demographic aging: the age group with most people is migrating upward. For planning purposes, a median age in the mid-30s indicates a population that is no longer very young, and is in fact nearing what demographers call “middle-aged.”
Yes, Turkey is aging. An “aging country” is typically defined by a growing share of elderly. Currently around 9–10% of Turks are 65 or older, and this proportion is rising. Turkey has recently crossed the threshold (about 12%) where a UN classification calls it a “very elderly” population. Over the next few decades, the proportion of senior citizens will continue to grow (projected to reach 15%+ by 2050). In everyday terms, this means Turkey must prepare for more pensioners and retirees, with implications for healthcare, social security, and the labor market. The working-age population itself will likely start to shrink after mid-century as the large birth cohorts of the past age and smaller cohorts follow them.
The age dependency ratio measures the number of dependents (young and old) per 100 working-age people. For Turkey, this ratio was about 49.1 in 2023. In the late 20th century, Turkey’s dependency ratio was much higher (driven by a very large child population), then it fell in the 2000s (as birth rates fell and many moved into the workforce). That created a “demographic dividend” period when relatively more people were working and fewer were dependents. However, that window is now closing: the dependency ratio is creeping upward again, but now because of aging. In other words, future dependency will come from seniors rather than children. This “closing window” means Turkey needs to find new growth drivers (e.g. productivity, higher labor participation) to compensate as the pool of working-age people stabilizes or declines.
Turkey’s population has a nearly even gender balance. The overall sex ratio (males per 100 females) in 2023 is about 1.01, essentially parity. At birth it is slightly above 1 (about 1.05 boys for every girl), and it remains just above 1.00 through most of the age groups until elderly ages (where female longevity causes a slight female majority). In practical terms, there is no significant gender imbalance – roughly 50.1% of Turks are male and 49.9% female. By social metrics (education, labor force) men and women remain differentiated, but demographically Turkey’s male and female populations are nearly equal in number.
Turkey’s official statistics do not publish ethnic or racial breakdowns, so any discussion of ethnic composition relies on estimates from other sources. The country is often described as ethnically diverse, with a Turkish majority and numerous minority groups. The broad picture is captured by international sources: for example, the CIA World Factbook estimates that ethnic Turks make up about 70–75% of the population, Kurds about 19%, and other ethnic groups (Arabs, Circassians, Roma, etc.) the remaining 6–11%. These figures are not census counts but expert estimates; some sources put the Kurdish share as high as 25%, but most converge around 18–20% of the total.
It is important to recognize why these numbers are uncertain. The Turkish government historically has discouraged ethnic census data, aiming to promote a unitary national identity. As a result, there has never been an official, recent breakdown by ethnicity beyond a generalized population count. Instead, TurkStat asks about language in education or birthplace, and counts students by “mother tongue,” which indirectly suggest ethnic origin. Meanwhile, international agencies and academics piece together estimates from local studies, linguistic surveys, and historical data. Therefore, ethnic percentages should be viewed as approximate. For example, Kurds are concentrated in the southeast and eastern provinces, while Turks (who are themselves a fusion of various Anatolian and Central Asian strains) dominate the rest of the country. Other groups live in specific regions: Arabs around Hatay and in cities, Armenians and Syriacs mainly in Istanbul and a few eastern locales, Romani across the country, etc.
The vast majority of Turkey’s people identify as Turkish. Ethnic Turks comprise roughly 70–75% of the population. This category includes not only the descendants of the Oghuz Turkic tribes who migrated centuries ago, but also most people who speak Turkish as their first language and follow mainstream Turkish culture. It is important to note that “Turkish” in this sense is a national/ethnic identity rather than a narrowly defined race or genetic lineage. Turks, in the Anatolian context, represent a blend of many historical populations (see next section), but in sociopolitical terms they form the dominant ethnic group.
Modern “Turkish” identity arose with the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey. In anthropological and genetic terms, Anatolian Turks carry a diverse heritage. Ancient inhabitants of Anatolia included Greeks, Hittites, Armenians, and many others. In the 11th century, Turkic tribes arrived from Central Asia and gradually mixed with local populations and imposed the Turkish language and culture. Recent genetic studies suggest that the gene pool of Anatolian Turks is heavily influenced by ancient Anatolian (and other Mediterranean/near Eastern) ancestry, with a significant but smaller contribution from Central Asian Turkic migrants. In practical terms, most Turks are not direct descendants of ancient Greeks or Persians, nor are they purely Central Asian; rather, they reflect the mosaic history of the region. The Turkic component (from Central Asian forebears) is estimated to be on the order of a few tens of percent in the gene pool, while the majority is shared with other populations of the region. (Precise figures vary by study, but the key point is that “Turks” today are a culturally unified people with mixed ancestry.)
Kurds are Turkey’s largest ethnic minority. They are estimated to make up about 18–20% of the population. Most Kurds live in the southeastern and eastern provinces, speaking Kurdish (Kurmanji or Zazaki dialects) and sharing Kurdish customs. Unlike the officially recognized Turkish identity, Kurdish identity has often been politically sensitive. The exact percentage is hard to pin down, but surveys and linguistic data consistently support that Kurds are on the order of one-fifth of the country’s people. The Kurdish population has also grown more slowly in recent decades, partly due to urban migration and assimilation, but it remains the largest identifiable minority group by a substantial margin.
A unique historical factor shapes Turkey’s minority groups: the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne (which established the borders of modern Turkey) granted special status only to certain non-Muslim minorities. Officially, only the Greek Orthodox (Rum) community, the Armenian Apostolic community, and the Jewish community are recognized as “minorities” under the treaty. In practice, this means only these groups have certain guaranteed rights (e.g. community schools, proportional representation in some institutions). In brief, the Treaty of Lausanne explicitly named Armenians, Orthodox Greeks, and Jews as ethnic/religious minorities. No other group (not even other Christian sects or Muslim minorities like the Alevis) was given this status. For example, the large Kurdish, Arab, Roma, and other minorities are not recognized as such under the treaty, despite their size or distinct identity. Today, the officially recognized communities are indeed small (tens of thousands of Greeks and Armenians, a few thousand Jews), but they still form part of Turkey’s multi-religious heritage.
Beyond Kurds, Greeks, Armenians and Jews, Turkey is home to numerous smaller ethnic communities. Some of the most notable include:
Each of these groups adds to Turkey’s cultural mosaic, but none is large enough to approach the scale of Turks or Kurds. In modern Turkey, minority languages and customs often persist in pockets but are under pressure of assimilation. Some groups, like the Roma or Laz, do not have official minority status but have active civil society organizations. Altogether, the population identifies officially as “Turkish” in nationality, but its roots are multiethnic.
Turkish law recognizes only one official language: Turkish. The 1982 Constitution (Article 3) explicitly states that “The language of the state is Turkish.”. This status applies to government, media, and public education. In practice, of course, many other languages are widely spoken across the country.
According to linguistic surveys and the CIA Factbook, the most common languages after Turkish are Kurdish (Kurmanji and Sorani dialects) and Zazaki, followed by Arabic and others. Turkish (of the Istanbul/Anatolian variety) is spoken natively by the vast majority. Kurdish is the next most widely spoken mother tongue; estimates suggest roughly 15–20% of households speak Kurdish at home. Other smaller minority languages include Arabic (especially among ethnic Arabs in the south), Circassian and other Caucasian languages, Roma dialects, and Laz. In urban areas and especially among younger people, English has become a significant second language due to education and globalization, and German is spoken by many who have relatives in Europe.
The official language of Turkey is Turkish. As noted, Article 3 of the Turkish Constitution declares, “Its language is Turkish.”. The form of Turkish used today was shaped by language reforms in the 1920s under Atatürk (Roman alphabet, removal of many Ottoman loanwords). All government business, courts, official publications, and primary education are conducted in Turkish. Citizens of all backgrounds learn Turkish as their first or second language from early schooling.
Yes, Kurdish (primarily the Kurmanji dialect) is widely spoken, particularly in the southeast. It is the most common non-Turkish mother tongue. Its use in public life was heavily restricted in the 20th century, but has been relaxed somewhat. Since 2013, schools are allowed to offer elective classes in Kurdish, and Kurdish can be used in politics and media under certain conditions. Despite these changes, Turkish remains the only official language and Kurdish does not have official status.
Other minority languages (Arabic, Circassian, etc.) similarly have limited recognition: in practice, they are spoken at home and in community settings, and there has been growing cultural allowance (TV programs, private courses). However, proficiency in Turkish is typically needed for wider opportunities. In short, Turkey is linguistically diverse in practice, but officially monolingual.
Turkey’s official stance on religion is secular, per the Constitution, but the populace is overwhelmingly Muslim. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (a state agency) reports that about 99.8% of Turks identify as Muslim. The vast majority of these (roughly 75–85% of all citizens) follow Sunni Islam. Sunni Islamic tradition (in its Hanafi school) has historically been the religious norm and continues to guide most religious practice.
The largest religious minority within Islam is the Alevi community, which combines elements of Shia theology and local Anatolian traditions. Alevis comprise on the order of 10–20% of the population (rough estimates, as no official count exists), and they are recognized by sociologists as the country’s largest non-Sunni Muslim group. Alevis have distinct rituals (holding services in cemevis instead of mosques, for example) and consider some of their religious leaders to be spiritual descents of Ali and the Imams. The Alevi identity is culturally significant and has been a focus of political and social discussions on minority rights.
Non-Muslim faith communities make up only about 0.2% of the population. These include Greek Orthodox Christians, Armenian Apostolic Christians, Syriac Christians, Roman Catholics, and Jews. In all cases these communities are small: for instance, only a few tens of thousands of Greek Orthodox remain (centered in Istanbul and the islands), and roughly the same for Armenians. Jews number only a few thousand, with synagogues mainly in Istanbul. Historically larger Christian and Jewish populations (prior to the mid-20th century) have dwindled due to migration, war, and population exchanges. Today these groups still maintain cultural and religious institutions, but their demographic weight is very minor.
Islam is by far the main religion. Virtually the entire population identifies as Muslim. By official figures (CIA World Factbook), about 99.8% of Turks are Muslim. Among these Muslims, the great majority are Sunnis. The remaining Muslims are mostly Alevis and a very small number of Shia Twelvers.
Yes. The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 as a secular (laik) state, breaking with the Ottoman system of a state religion. Turkey’s 1982 Constitution explicitly proclaims it a “democratic, secular and social state”. The term laicism (from the French laïcité) refers to the strict separation of religion and state. In practice, this has meant that mosques and churches are not arms of the government, and the government does not enforce religious laws. Education in public schools is officially secular, and religious garb is restricted in government institutions.
That said, secularism in Turkey has a particular historical flavor. Unlike the French model of state atheism, Turkey’s secularism (introduced by Atatürk) allowed personal faith but removed religion from public power. Over time, this has been adjusted (for example, allowing limited religious education in schools, and maintaining the Directorate of Religious Affairs to administer Sunni mosques). In any case, by constitutional definition the state itself has no religion, making Turkey formally secular even though the population is devout.
As noted, over 99% of Turkey’s population is Muslim. This is overwhelmingly Sunni. Reliable surveys suggest that about 70–75% of all Turks are Sunni Hanafi Muslims. Alevis (who also identify as Muslim) may be about 15–20%. Other Muslim groups (like small Twelver Shia, mostly immigrants) make up the rest. Because religion is a sensitive topic, figures are approximate, but the Sunni majority is clear. In absolute terms, Turkey has one of the largest Sunni Muslim populations in the world.
Alevis are a distinct Islamic community, centered mainly in eastern Anatolia and among some cities. They follow a syncretic tradition influenced by Shia Islam and Turkic/Balkan folklore. Culturally, Alevis revere figures like Ali (Muhammad’s cousin) and the Twelve Imams, but their rituals (called cem ceremonies) differ markedly from Sunni practice. Alevis tend to be more liberal on social issues and place less emphasis on mosques (they have cemevi meeting houses instead).
Estimating numbers is difficult, but Alevis are often cited at 10–20% of the population. Because Aleviship was historically downplayed by the state (many Alevis were counted simply as Muslim Turks in official data), there is no precise count. However, Alevis are widely acknowledged as Turkey’s largest non-Sunni religious group. They are often grouped under “Muslim” statistics, which masks their unique identity. In recent years, there has been growing recognition of Alevis’ rights (for example, to teach Alevi traditions in schools), but full equality with Sunni institutions remains a matter of political debate.
Yes, but very small numbers remain. Turkey’s Christian minority today is tiny: perhaps a few dozen thousand in total. This includes Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Syriac Orthodox, Catholics, Protestants, etc. Istanbul retains some historic churches, but most towns in Anatolia have long since lost their Christian communities. The Jewish population is even smaller (on the order of 15,000), centering in Istanbul and Izmir. Each of these groups has certain legal protections, but their modern presence is a shadow of the multi-religious Ottoman era. In demographic terms, Christians and Jews together account for well under 0.5% of the population.
Official data on atheism or irreligion is scarce. However, surveys indicate that explicit atheism or non-religious self-identification is low, likely a few percent of the population. Public surveys have found that the majority of Turks consider themselves religious and pray regularly. That said, there is a segment of the population (especially among urban youth and intellectuals) that identifies as “secular,” agnostic, or non-believer. Over the past decades, Turkey has seen a modest rise in open secularism: more people publicly describe themselves as “just Muslim by tradition” or “atheist.” Estimates from polls around 2020 suggest maybe 2–3% self-identify as atheist or non-religious. Exact numbers are hard to come by. What is clear is that traditional faith remains strong overall, but attitudes toward religion and personal belief are diversifying, reflecting global trends.
Turkey is now a highly urbanized country. According to official figures, about 77.5% of Turks live in urban areas as of 2023. (The UN/World Bank also estimate roughly 77–78%.) In the 1960s, under half of the population was urban; massive rural-to-urban migration in the 20th century has reshaped settlement patterns. Today Turkey’s urban network is concentrated in the west and northwest. The Marmara region (which includes Istanbul and Bursa) is the most densely populated. About one in five Turks lives in Istanbul alone. The Aegean and Mediterranean coastal regions (Izmir, Antalya, Adana) are also heavily urbanized, as are parts of Central Anatolia (Ankara) and the southeast (Diyarbakır, Gaziantep). Interior and eastern Anatolia have much lower densities, with small scattered cities amid agricultural lands.
In numbers, the population density of Turkey is roughly 114 people per square kilometer. By comparison, this is lower than many European countries (e.g. 240/km² in the EU) but higher than its immediate neighbors like Iran (50/km²) or Iraq (92/km²). The variation is regional: Istanbul province density exceeds 2,600/km², whereas the least populous province (Tunceli) has under 20/km². Overall, Turkey’s mix of urban and rural densities reflects its history as a land bridge between Europe and Asia, where coastal plains and river basins concentrate settlements, while highlands and plateaus remain sparse.
About 78% of Turkey’s people live in cities or towns (2023 data). This represents the summit of a long urbanization curve: Turkey was roughly 25% urban in 1950, 64% urban by 2000, and has climbed steadily since. The migration to cities accelerated during industrialization (1950s onward) and continues today, though now at a slower rate (urban growth ~1.1% per year). Nearly every large town we see today is a product of 20th-century growth, including some that were minor villages before.
As noted, the largest concentration is around the Bosporus and Sea of Marmara. According to the CIA World Factbook, “the most densely populated area is found around the Bosporus in the northwest where 20% of the population lives in Istanbul”. Beyond Istanbul (15.8M), the next five largest urban agglomerations (2023 est.) are Ankara (~5.4M), Izmir (~3.1M), Bursa (~2.1M), Adana (~1.8M), and Gaziantep (~1.8M). Each of these sits in a fertile plain or near water – reflecting geography’s role in settlement.
Other major centers include Konya (an agricultural-industrial hub in central Anatolia), Diyarbakır (cultural center of Kurdish southeast), and Antalya (a Mediterranean tourism center). Coastal cities generally draw population through commerce and manufacturing, while many rural provinces in the interior are losing people to these urban magnets. In terms of regional distribution, the population clustering is uneven: the rich western corridor (Marmara–Aegean) has most people, whereas the eastern highlands and much of Central Anatolia remain thinly populated.
The table below lists the approximate population of Turkey’s five largest cities as of 2023, based on official estimates:
| City | Population (2023 est.) | Notes/Source |
|---|---|---|
| Istanbul | 15,848,000 | Turkey’s largest city |
| Ankara | 5,397,000 | Capital city |
| Izmir | 3,088,000 | Major Aegean port |
| Bursa | 2,086,000 | Industrial center near Istanbul |
| Adana | 1,836,000 | Major city in the south |
These cities alone account for roughly 30 million people – well over one-third of Turkey’s population. Istanbul alone (~15.8M) is nearly twice the size of any other city. The next tier of cities (Antalya, Konya, Gaziantep, etc.) each have 1–2 million inhabitants. Turkey’s urbanization is thus characterized by one megacity, several large metropolitan areas, and a long tail of smaller cities.
Migration has been a constant theme in Turkey’s demographic story.
Internal migration: Over the past seven decades, Turkey has experienced massive internal migration from rural to urban areas. In the 1950s–60s, agricultural mechanization and regional disparities pushed millions off the Anatolian plains into industrializing western cities. This continues today, albeit at a slower pace. Each year, hundreds of thousands move in search of work and education. The result is that many provinces, especially in the east and southeast (e.g. Tunceli, Erzurum), have stagnant or declining populations, while coastal and western provinces (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, the Aegean, Antalya) have grown explosively. The country’s settlement pattern has thus shifted from agrarian villages to high-rise apartments and highways.
Emigration and the Turkish Diaspora: Since the 1960s, many Turks have emigrated abroad. The most famous example is the “guest worker” program: starting around 1961, West Germany (and later other European countries) recruited Turkish labor, sending an estimated 2–3 million Turks to Europe over the decades. Today the Turkish diaspora in Europe is roughly 5–6 million strong (mostly in Germany), and another million or so in North America and the Middle East. These people are Turkish citizens (or descendants) but live outside Turkey; if they do not return, they are not counted in Turkey’s population. Thus, Turkey’s total human “footprint” is larger than its domestic population. Emigration has eased some pressure on the domestic job market, but it has also exported a sizable portion of the working-age population. Remittances from abroad have been an important source of income for Turkey over the years.
Refugee and asylum dynamics: In recent times, migration into Turkey has been dominated by refugees. Turkey has accepted over 3.2 million Syrian refugees fleeing conflict (along with hundreds of thousands from Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and elsewhere). This makes Turkey the world’s largest refugee-hosting nation. These refugees are generally registered as “people under temporary protection” and live across the country (with large numbers in Istanbul, Hatay, Sanliurfa, Kilis, and Gaziantep). Official population statistics typically exclude this group from the “resident population,” but their presence undeniably affects demographics: by boosting the number of children and young adults, by adding cultural diversity (primarily Arabic-speaking), and by influencing local labor markets and education systems. For example, children of refugees can attend Turkish schools, and many adults work legally or informally. How Turkey integrates or naturalizes this large refugee population will have long-term demographic consequences (e.g. births, language shift, ethnic composition).
Turkey currently hosts the world’s largest refugee population. According to UNHCR, as of 2025 there are about 3.2 million registered Syrian refugees in Turkey. In addition, there are roughly 220,000 people from other conflict zones (Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.). These figures make refugee issues a central element of Turkish demography. Syrians alone amount to almost 4% of Turkey’s official population count – a significant factor for social services and labor markets. In some southeastern provinces, refugees constitute a very high share of the local population. It is important to note that most analysts do not include these refugees in Turkey’s population projections (because they are not Turkish citizens), but in practice they contribute to births, schooling, and economy. Turkey’s demographic future will be shaped partly by how these refugee populations (especially the children) are integrated and whether they remain in Turkey long-term or return home after conditions change.
Turkey has made remarkable strides in education over the past decades. Today basic literacy is nearly universal: TurkStat reports a literacy rate (age 6+) of 97.6% in 2023 (from 91.8% in 2008). Among women it has risen from 86.9% to 96% over 2008–2023, reflecting closing gender gaps. Overall, virtually all children attend primary school, and primary completion rates exceed 98%.
Secondary and higher education have also expanded. The average number of years of schooling for adults (aged 25+) has reached 9.3 years in 2023 (up from 7.3 years in 2011). In concrete terms, nearly one quarter (24.6%) of Turks age 25+ now have a university or vocational degree (associate’s to PhD). This share has roughly doubled since 2008. At the other end, about 48.3% of adults aged 25+ have at least a primary school education, up from 26.5% in 2008. These gains reflect government investments in schools and opening of many new universities in the 2000s and 2010s.
As of 2023, TurkStat reports that the literacy rate (age 6+) is 97.6%. This is one of the highest literacy rates in the region. By gender, 99.2% of men and 96.0% of women in that age group are literate. The near-universal literacy marks a dramatic shift from the early Republic, when literacy was under 10% (1927 census). Today even remote regions have virtually no illiterate children, a testament to nationwide schooling programs.
“Education level” can mean many things, but common measures include average schooling years and attainment rates. By TurkStat data (2023), the average years of education for adults (25+) is about 9.3 years. This overall average reflects the expansion of schooling; it was only 7.3 years in 2011. Among young adults (25–34), average schooling is higher (often over 12 years) than among older cohorts, which is typical of a country undergoing education expansion.
In terms of qualifications: about 24.6% of people over 25 hold a higher education diploma (associate or bachelor’s and above). That percentage has been rising rapidly (it was 9.8% in 2008). Roughly half of the adult population (48.3%) has completed at least primary school (compared to only 26.5% in 2008). Thus Turkey today has a large segment of its citizens with middle or high school education, and a growing professional/academic class.
Turkey’s education system is organized into stages: Pre-primary (optional; typically 1 year of preschool), Primary (4 years), Middle (4 years), and High School (4 years) – making 12 years of compulsory education (implemented nationwide in 2012). Most students attend public schools, though private schooling (especially at secondary and university levels) has expanded. After high school, students take national university entrance exams to enter undergraduate programs. In the 2000s and 2010s Turkey built dozens of universities and significantly increased higher education enrollment (millions now in post-secondary education).
Key points of the system: education is free and mandatory through age 18; instruction is mainly in Turkish, although private elective courses in minority languages (Kurdish, Arabic, etc.) exist; and adult education/literacy programs have been used to bring older generations up to speed (helping to raise that 97.6% literacy rate). The Ministry of National Education (MEB) oversees schools, while the higher education council (YÖK) oversees universities. Overall, Turkey’s education infrastructure is much improved, with more classrooms, teachers, and students at every level than in past decades.
Turkey is classified by the World Bank as an upper-middle-income country, and its economy is among the largest in the world. In fact, in 2024 Turkey’s GDP (nominal) was about $1.32 trillion, ranking it roughly 17th globally. It is a member of the OECD and the G20 (the group of major economies), reflecting its growing role. Within Turkey, the economic contribution of the population is marked by a diverse workforce: services (especially tourism and finance) and industry (textiles, automobiles, electronics) are major employers, along with significant agriculture in rural areas.
Despite the substantial economy, Turkey is not considered “fully developed” in Western terms. It is a newly industrialized country with significant rural areas and development gaps. Per capita GDP is around $15,500 (2024), which places it in the upper-middle range globally. The official unemployment rate was 8.4% in May 2025, which is moderate but masks regional and gender gaps (unemployment for women ~11.9% in that month vs. 6.5% for men).
Turkey’s economy has seen high growth since the 2000s, though it has faced challenges (notably inflation and currency volatility in recent years). Over the long run (2002–2024), per capita income roughly doubled in real terms. A young population and migration have historically provided labor for this growth. Officially, Turkey enjoys a “high middle-income” status. Key partners include the EU (Turkish exports and imports are largely with Europe) and increasingly regional neighbors. For ordinary people, this means more employment opportunities in the cities than in the villages; however, income inequality and education gaps remain issues.
By most classifications, Turkey is an emerging market and developing country. It straddles the line: it has an advanced industrial sector and strategic geopolitical role (OECD, G20 member), yet also faces problems of lower-income economies (still significant poverty pockets, relatively low innovation metrics, etc.). The World Bank’s classification is upper-middle-income. In summary, Turkey is more developed than many of its neighbors but not as wealthy or fully post-industrial as Western Europe or North America. This mixed status is sometimes summarized in official parlance as “developing country, modernizing economy.” For policy purposes, Turkey navigates both roles: attracting foreign investment (like a developed nation) and continuing development projects (like a developing nation).
Citing the World Bank overview: “Türkiye is the 17th largest economy in the world with a GDP of $1.32 trillion as of 2024. It is a member of the OECD and the G20…”. At the same time, the Bank notes that Turkey faces challenges typical of developing countries (poverty reduction, inequality, etc.). Thus it is best seen as a major emerging market.
Turkey’s labor force is large and has grown with the population. As of mid-2025, the labor force (persons aged 15 and over actively working or seeking work) was about 35.49 million. The labor force participation rate was around 53.5% (meaning roughly half of all adults are in the labor force). There is a stark gender gap: about 70.9% of men participate in the labor market versus only 36.5% of women (May 2025).
In May 2025, the unemployment rate was 8.4% (this represents persons who are not working but are actively seeking work, among the labor force). Unemployment has been gradually falling from higher levels (e.g. it was 10–12% in the late 2010s). Among youth (ages 15–24), the unemployment rate is much higher (~15.4% in May 2025), reflecting challenges in entry-level jobs. By sector, many new jobs have been in services and construction; agriculture has declined as a share of both employment and GDP.
This employment picture means that Turkey has not yet achieved “full employment.” Millions of people are still entering the labor force each year (as more young adults complete education) and must find jobs. On the positive side, the large working-age population (over 68% of all people) is a resource: if they work, Turkey can sustain its welfare systems. One structural challenge is encouraging higher labor force participation among women and youth; that would raise the effective labor supply and support economic growth.
Turkey’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is currently about $1.32 trillion (2024, nominal). This makes it the largest economy in the Middle East (if counted separately) and about the 17th largest globally. The country’s GDP per capita is roughly $15,500 (2024). Economic growth has averaged a few percent in the 2010s (turbocharged by credit and exports) and cooled somewhat in the early 2020s. The sectoral composition of GDP is roughly: services (40–45%), industry (25–30%), and agriculture (around 10–15%), with the rest in construction and mining.
Importantly, Turkey’s GDP is much larger than it was two decades ago: rapid growth and investment (including foreign investment) transformed a historically agrarian economy into an industrial and service-led one. However, GDP alone does not measure living standards directly. On measures like Human Development Index or GDP per capita, Turkey still lags many European and North American countries. The government’s goals include moving up to high-income status by raising productivity and export sophistication. In summary, Turkey’s economy is substantial but still developing in character: it boasts big industries and global reach, but also significant internal disparities and reliance on imported energy and middle-tech manufacturing.
Turks today live much longer, on average, than in the past. Current data put the life expectancy at birth in Turkey at about 78 years (2024). Breaking it down: female life expectancy is higher (~78–79 years) and male lower (~74–75 years), which is a typical gender gap seen worldwide. This represents a big improvement from a few decades ago, when life expectancy was in the low 60s. Gains have come from better healthcare, wider vaccination, and safer drinking water. As a result, deaths per year are relatively low: the crude death rate is around 6 per 1,000.
As of 2023–2024, life expectancy at birth in Turkey is roughly 77–78 years. The World Bank data (2024) gives 78.5 years, while the CIA estimates about 76.5 years (2023). The slight difference comes from methodology and updates, but both indicate that a newborn Turkish child today can expect to live to roughly age 78 on average. This is comparable to many European countries, though a few years below the top performers (like Spain or Switzerland at 83+). The gender breakdown (female ~79, male ~74) suggests improvements are still needed for men, but overall Turkey has made significant strides: for instance, life expectancy was only about 65 years in the 1980s. Most regions of Turkey now have relatively uniform life expectancy, thanks to nationwide healthcare coverage (over 90% of the population is covered by some health insurance scheme).
Key health indicators show major improvements over time. The infant mortality rate (deaths under age 1 per 1,000 live births) has fallen to about 18.9 per 1,000 in 2023. In 2000, it was over 60, so this represents a dramatic reduction. Lower infant mortality is due to better prenatal care, expanded hospitals (especially rural clinics), and vaccination campaigns.
The maternal mortality ratio (maternal deaths per 100,000 live births) is about 17 (2020 est.). This is also a substantial drop from the past (it was over 100 in 1990). Turkey has worked to ensure that most births occur in medical facilities with trained professionals, which accounts for most of the decline. Both of these rates are now close to what many upper-middle-income countries have achieved, reflecting effective public health efforts.
Beyond life expectancy and mortality, Turkey ranks fairly well on other social measures. For example, nearly 99–100% of the population has access to improved drinking water and sanitation. Adult obesity is rising (about 32% of adults in 2016), reflecting global lifestyle changes. Tobacco use is significant (total ~30% of adults in 2020). Literacy (as noted) is very high (96.7% in 2019).
Healthcare access has broadened: the number of physicians is about 1.9 per 1,000 people and hospital beds about 2.9 per 1,000, figures that have risen over time. Total health spending is around 4.6% of GDP (2020), which is moderate. In short, Turkey’s health profile shows classic middle-income status: broad immunization and primary care keep basic public health strong, but non-communicable diseases (heart disease, diabetes) are rising with lifestyle changes, and there is ongoing need to address rural health gaps.
Turkey stands today at a critical demographic crossroads. The central narrative is no longer one of simple, rapid population growth, but one of complex transition and balance. For decades, Turkey rode a demographic wave: high fertility, a youthful population, and expanding cities that helped power one of the largest economies in the region. Now that wave is receding. Fertility has dropped well below replacement, life spans have risen, and the working-age population is nearing its peak. The closing “demographic window of opportunity” means Turkey must find new drivers for prosperity even as its workforce begins to age. In practical terms, this will test social services and the pension system: caring for a growing number of elderly people will require adapting healthcare, housing and social security programs.
Concurrently, Turkey’s long-standing success in building a unified national identity must be balanced with the realities of its diversity. The country’s ethnic and religious mosaic – Turks, Kurds, Alevis, Armenians, Greeks, and many others – is a source of cultural richness but also of political sensitivity. Ensuring that all communities feel valued (for example, by respecting minority language rights, improving women’s education and employment, and upholding secularism without marginalizing devout citizens) will shape social cohesion. Overlaid on these trends is the immediate impact of recent events: most notably, hosting over three million Syrian refugees. This influx is a demographic event of historic magnitude for Turkey, affecting local labor markets, schools, and the age structure (refugees are disproportionately young).
How Turkey navigates these converging challenges in the years ahead will determine its trajectory for the rest of the 21st century. Will the nation innovate in education and employment to harness the full potential of its people? Will it find a sustainable balance between secular law and religious tradition? Can it integrate its ethnically diverse and refugee populations into a shared future? The demographic data tell us where Turkey stands now; the policy choices will shape where it heads next. One thing is clear: Turkey’s future success depends on adapting to an aging population, leveraging its human capital wisely, and embracing its diversity as a strength.