Turkey’s story is the story of human civilization. For over 11,000 years Anatolia – the peninsula that today forms most of Turkey – has been continuously inhabited and culturally rich. This land bridges Europe and Asia, earning the title “cradle of civilization”. Indeed, at Göbekli Tepe (southeastern Anatolia) archaeologists have uncovered monumental T-shaped limestone pillars in circular enclosures built around 9500–8000 BC. These stone sanctuaries predate pottery and even farming, showing that organized religion arose very early here. Centuries later, the Neolithic town of Çatalhöyük (in the Konya Plain) housed perhaps 3,000–8,000 people around 7000–6500 BC. Its densely packed mud-brick homes, decorated with murals and shrines, were repeatedly rebuilt one atop another (18 layers in all). The existence of such early temples and cities demonstrates why Anatolia is seen as a foundational region in world history.
The earliest chapters of Anatolia’s history are written in stone. At Göbekli Tepe, near modern Şanlıurfa in southeastern Turkey, excavations have revealed circular temples composed of massive, T-shaped pillars carved with animal reliefs. Radiocarbon dates show these enclosures were erected around 9500–8000 BC, by pre-agricultural hunter-gatherers. This site, thousands of years older than Stonehenge, indicates that religion and communal ritual preceded farming in this region. A few hundred miles west, on the Konya Plain, lies Çatalhöyük: a sprawling Neolithic village dating c.7500–5600 BC. At its height around 6500–6000 BC, it covered about 34 acres and may have sheltered 3,000–8,000 people. Home-owners arranged their houses in a dense honeycomb, entering via roofs and decorating interior walls with painted deer hunts and bull skulls. Remarkably, the site contains 18 superimposed occupation layers, as one generation dismantled and rebuilt homes over old foundations. Göbekli Tepe and Çatalhöyük together show that Anatolia’s first farmers and priests built some of the world’s earliest cities and temples.
By the early 2nd millennium BC, Anatolia was organized into early states. The native Hattians of central Anatolia were superseded by Indo-European newcomers who formed the Hittite Kingdom. The Hittites made their capital at Hattusa (modern Boğazkale), a name derived from the older Hattian people. At Hattusa today, one can see the ruins of fortified walls and stone reliefs. These royal archives – thousands of cuneiform tablets – tell us that by the mid-2nd millennium BC the Hittites had become “one of the dominant powers of the Middle East”. Under kings like Hattusili I and his successors, the Hittite Empire ruled all Anatolia and pushed into northern Syria. One ruler, Mursilis I, even sacked Babylon around 1590 BC.
In rock-cut sanctuaries around Hattusa, Hittite kings and gods are carved in stone, a legacy that survives to this day. The name Hattusa itself recalls the vanished Hattians, hinting at the layers of peoples in Anatolia. Yet like its neighbors, the Hittite state eventually fragmented. Around 1200 BC – the great Bronze Age collapse – Hittite power suddenly fell. Mysterious migrations of the “Sea Peoples” and internal upheavals appear to have shattered the old order. After that date, Anatolia split into smaller Iron Age kingdoms, and new players emerged on the stage.
One famous chapter involves the city of Troy. For centuries its story was only known from Homer’s epic poems, but archaeology has confirmed that Troy was real. The mound of Hissarlik (northwestern Anatolia) was an occupied city from about 3000 BC onward. In the Late Bronze Age (c.1750–1200 BC) the citadel had massive defensive walls and dominated the Dardanelles trade route. In the 1870s archaeologist Heinrich Schliemann excavated the layered ruins and eventually convinced experts that this site was indeed the legendary Troy. In other words, Homer’s bronze-age city had a real counterpart. It appears that Troy was destroyed (fire and collapse) around 1180 BC – roughly the same era when Hittite and Mycenaean societies fell. While we cannot prove every detail of the Trojan War myth, the Troy excavations bridge myth and history: they show a war-torn city at the right time and place.
After the Bronze Age upheaval, new peoples ruled Anatolia. To the west of the Hittite lands rose the Phrygians, an Iron Age people famed in legend for King Midas (of the golden touch). Little written record survives, but archaeological sites (like Gordion) attest to a prospering Phrygian culture in the 8th–7th centuries BC. In the far west, the Lydian kingdom (capital Sardis) became immensely wealthy. It was in Lydia that money as we know it was invented. Around 600 BC King Alyattes I of Lydia issued the first metal coins, made of electrum (a natural gold-silver alloy) stamped with a lion’s head. His son Croesus (reigned c.560–546 BC) later introduced standardized pure gold coins (the famous “Croeseids”). These innovations revolutionized trade throughout the ancient world. Under Croesus, Sardis built the great Temple of Artemis at Ephesus (one of the Seven Wonders) and the Lydian kingdom briefly extended into neighboring peoples.
Anatolia’s riches made it a target of the Persian Empire. In 547 BC Cyrus the Great conquered Lydia and absorbed all of Anatolia. The region was administered as the Persian satrapy of “Asia,” with governors loyal to the king of kings. The Ionian Greek cities along the Aegean coast now found themselves under Persian rule. Tensions soon flared: in 499 BC the Ionian city-states rebelled against Persia (the Ionian Revolt), even appealing to Athens for support. The revolt was eventually crushed by the Persians, but it set off a chain of events – including the famous Persian Wars of Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea – in which Anatolia again became a battleground between East and West. Thus by 334 BC, Anatolia’s multi-millennium native story was about to enter a new chapter with the arrival of Alexander the Great.
In 334 BC Alexander III of Macedon launched a campaign against Persia. He crossed the Hellespont (Dardanelles) into Anatolia with roughly 48,000 soldiers and 6,100 cavalry. Alexander swept through Asia Minor, winning battles at the river Granicus and Issus, and accepted the surrender of Sardis and other cities. Within a few years, Persian rule in Anatolia was broken. Alexander founded or renamed cities (Antioch, Pergamon among them) and spread Greek language and culture everywhere. The Hellenistic era transformed Anatolia: Greek philosophy, theatre, and architecture flourished in cities like Ephesus, Pergamon, and Tarsus. This cultural blend of Greek and Eastern elements persisted after Alexander’s death (323 BC) under the successors (Seleucids, then Romans).
By 133 BC the last king of independent Pergamon (Attalus III) left his realm to Rome. Thus western Anatolia became the Roman province of Asia. In the following centuries, Rome gradually absorbed all of Anatolia. Under Roman rule Anatolia enjoyed the Pax Romana – centuries of relative peace and prosperity. Roman roads and aqueducts knit the land together; monumental forums, temples, baths and theaters sprung up in cities. For example, the Temple of Artemis in Ephesus was rebuilt as a grand marble sanctuary, and the city of Side in Pamphylia boasted an enormous colonnaded square and theater. Roman law and urban life (baths, libraries, gladiatorial games) became the norm in Anatolian cities. Christianity also took root. The apostle Paul journeyed through Anatolia in the 1st century AD, founding communities in Ephesus, Antioch of Pisidia, Derbe and elsewhere. The New Testament’s Book of Revelation addresses the “Seven Churches of Asia” in western Anatolia – testament to how early these cities embraced the new faith.
Emperor Constantine I profoundly changed Anatolia’s future. In 330 AD he dedicated a new imperial capital on the site of Byzantium, calling it “New Rome” (later known as Constantinople). Constantine also ended the persecution of Christianity and promoted it; eventually Emperor Theodosius (r.379–395) made Christianity the state religion. When the Roman Empire formally split in 395, Constantinople became the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire – the Byzantine Empire. For nearly a thousand years, Anatolia formed the core of Byzantium. It remained Roman by law and Greek-speaking by culture, and Orthodox Christian by religion. The Byzantine emperors constructed great fortresses (such as the walls of Constantinople), cities (Antioch, Nicaea, Nicomedia) and Christian monuments (Hagia Sophia). Anatolia’s strategic land and grain helped sustain the empire. Over these centuries Anatolia weathered Persian, Arab, and later Turkish assaults. Each invasion drained resources; on the long road to 1071 AD, the Byzantines were slowly weakened by wars with Persia and Islam.
The decisive turning point came at the Battle of Manzikert in 1071. Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes marched east to confront the Turks, but near Lake Van his army was defeated by the Seljuk Turks under Sultan Alp Arslan. Romanos was captured (later ransomed), and Byzantine field armies shattered. The result was profound: Anatolia’s military barrier was broken. Thousands of Turks streamed in. Peasants, warriors, and nomads took advantage of the chaos, settling in cities and fields. Within a decade large portions of central and eastern Anatolia were effectively lost by the Byzantines. This historic defeat “marked the beginning of the end” for Byzantine dominance in Anatolia.
In the aftermath of Manzikert, a Turkish principality was established on former Roman soil. In 1077 a Seljuk prince named Suleiman ibn Qutalmish founded the Sultanate of Rûm (Rûm meaning “Rome”) in northwestern Anatolia. They first made Nicaea their capital and later moved it to Iconium (today Konya). Rûm was conceived as the successor over “Rûm” (Byzantine lands). Over the 12th century the sultans of Rûm expanded westward, taking cities like Nicaea (temporarily recaptured by Crusaders in 1097, but recovered soon after) and even attempting to capture Constantinople. They repelled the First and Second Crusades at times. The Seljuks developed their own architecture (stone caravanserais dotting Anatolian trade routes) and promoted Persianate culture at Konya’s court. For a time, the Sultanate of Rûm represented a stable Islamic state in the heart of Anatolia.
That stability ended with the Mongols. In 1243 the Seljuks of Rûm faced the Mongol army at Köse Dağ and were decisively beaten. The Sultanate of Rûm did not collapse outright, but it became a vassal of the Mongol Ilkhanate. Real power slipped away from the sultans. Anatolia fractured as various Turkish leaders (beys or beysliks) carved out autonomous principalities. By the late 13th century the once-united Seljuk state had broken into a patchwork of rival beyliks. Among them was a small principality led by Osman I in Bithynia, northwestern Anatolia. This fragmentation actually set the stage for the rise of the Ottomans, who would outlast all the other beyliks and reunify most of the land.
One small beylik laid claim to greatness. Around 1299 Osman I declared independence for his Turkoman clan on the Byzantine frontier. His descendants (Osman’s son Orhan and grandson Murad) expanded steadily. By 1326 Orhan had seized Bursa and made it the Ottoman capital. Over the next century the Ottomans absorbed other beyliks, conquered Gallipoli in Europe (1354), and moved into the Balkans. By the late 15th century the Ottoman state had become an empire. Historians note that what started as a tiny principality “transformed into a vast empire in the centuries after” its founder’s death. This transformation relied on a flexible military system and savvy diplomacy, as the Ottomans inherited both the Roman/Byzantine legacy and a powerful Islamic tradition.
The pinnacle of Ottoman expansion came in 1453. Sultan Mehmed II, only 21 years old, laid siege to Constantinople. After a 55-day campaign, the city fell on May 29, 1453. With that victory, the Ottomans toppled the Byzantine Empire’s last remnant. Mehmed II made Constantinople (Istanbul) his capital, symbolically crowning himself as Rome’s successor. This conquest “marked the effective end” of the 1,100-year-old Roman imperial state. From now on, the Ottomans would rule a territory stretching from Eastern Europe to Arabia. Constantinople’s capture also sent shockwaves to Europe and marked the end of the medieval era. Mehmed commissioned Hagia Sophia to be converted into a mosque, and Istanbul grew into a bustling metropolis linking continents and cultures.
The empire reached its zenith under Süleyman I (r.1520–1566). Under him, Ottoman power stretched from Hungary down to Yemen and from Algiers to Baghdad. He led campaigns that captured Belgrade (1521), Rhodes (1522), most of Hungary (including at Mohács, 1526), and advanced to the gates of Vienna (1529). Meanwhile Süleyman was a great patron of the arts and law. Europeans nicknamed him “the Magnificent” for his splendor, while in Ottoman lands he was called Kanuni, the Lawgiver, for codifying the empire’s legal code. His era saw an efflorescence of Ottoman architecture (with master architect Mimar Sinan designing mosques and bridges), literature, and the classical Ottoman administrative system. As one scholar notes, under Süleyman “the Ottoman Empire achieved a Golden Age of culture and power”.
A unique Ottoman institution was the devshirme (blood tax). Periodically, Ottoman officials collected young Christian boys from the Balkans and Anatolia. These children were taken to Istanbul, converted to Islam, and rigorously trained for the state. Most became Janissaries, the sultan’s elite infantry corps; others became high officials or administrators. The devshirme produced fiercely loyal servants of the Sultan. Paradoxically, it was also a vehicle for social mobility: boys who might have been villagers became generals, governors or even grand viziers. For example, many 15th–17th century Ottoman viziers and military commanders came through this system. Although it was effectively forced recruitment, for generations this set-up ensured the Ottomans had a powerful, professional army and bureaucracy whose foremost loyalty was to the Sultan. (The Janissaries themselves became a powerful political force over time.)
After Süleyman’s death, a gradual decline set in. The once-fearsome Janissaries became corrupt and resistant to change. Wars on multiple fronts – against Austria, Russia, Persia – increasingly drained the treasury and revealed Ottoman technological lag behind Europe. Economically, competition from Atlantic trade routes weakened Ottoman commerce. Politically, bad leadership and palace intrigue undermined efficiency. Most significantly, the rise of nationalism among subject peoples (Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Arabs) eroded the empire from within. By the 19th century, reformers called for modernization, but conservative forces resisted. In Europe, observers contemptuously labeled the empire “the Sick Man of Europe” (a phrase credited to Tsar Nicholas I in 1853). Indeed, by 1800 the empire was clearly fading as a great power.
From 1839 into the 1870s the sultans undertook the Tanzimat (Reorganization) reforms. These were state-led attempts to modernize the Ottoman system along Western lines. Reforms included reorganizing the army (modeled on European armies), rationalizing administration of provinces, and drafting new civil and penal codes. The famous Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856 proclaimed equal rights in theory for all (Muslim and non-Muslim) citizens. New secular schools were founded, and Sharia law courts were gradually replaced with secular courts (inspired by Swiss, French, or Italian codes). Many of these changes were idealistic attempts to bind diverse peoples together and stop separatist movements. In practice they had mixed results: some elites embraced the new system, but traditionalists often resisted. Nonetheless, the Tanzimat era (1839–1876) marks a critical moment when the Ottomans tried to “Westernize” government, economy, and society.
At the turn of the 20th century a new political force appeared. The Young Turks were a coalition of intellectuals, army officers, and bureaucrats pushing for secular nationalism and constitutional rule. In 1908 they compelled Sultan Abdul Hamid II to restore the 1876 constitution and parliament, ending his autocracy. Soon the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, the main Young Turk faction) became the real power in the government. By 1913 they had seized full control (in a coup d’état). Driven by their ideology of Turkish nationalism, the Young Turks steered the empire into alliance with Germany in World War I. Their leaders (including Enver Pasha, Talaat Pasha and Djemal Pasha) hoped a German victory would help restore Ottoman fortunes. Tragically, this era is also marked by the Ottoman Empire’s darkest chapter: under CUP rule in 1915 the government carried out what many historians call the Armenian Genocide (and related persecutions of Assyrians and Greeks). When World War I ended in defeat for the Central Powers, the Ottoman Empire was on the brink of collapse.
The Ottoman Empire’s final defeat came in 1918. With its economy shattered, the government signed the Armistice of Mudros in October 1918, effectively ending the war. Shortly afterward, Allied armies began occupying Ottoman territories: British troops landed in Istanbul and the straits, French in southern Anatolia, Italians in southwestern ports, and (most provocatively) Greek forces landed in Izmir (Smyrna) in 1919. Constantinople itself was under Allied control by 1920. The Ottoman government, humiliated and powerless, negotiated the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) which imposed harsh terms: Anatolia was to be partitioned (parts given to Greece, France, Italy, and a new Armenian state). Thus by 1920 it seemed the Ottoman state was ending; a few islands and a rump Anatolian strip under foreign oversight was all that was left in theory.
During the war, the Young Turk government enacted a catastrophic policy toward its Armenian subjects. Citing alleged Armenian collusion with Russia, the Ottomans forcibly deported hundreds of thousands of Armenians from eastern Anatolia. Many were marched into the Syrian desert; others were massacred en route. Independent scholars estimate that between roughly 600,000 and 1.2 million Armenians perished. This campaign was accompanied by the killing and expulsion of other Christian minorities (Assyrians, Pontic Greeks). Today most historians recognize these events as genocide, though the modern Turkish state has long disputed that term. In any case, by 1923 Anatolia’s historic Armenian community had been almost completely destroyed or driven out. (These events are treated factually in this history, but they remain one of its most painful topics.)
In response to Allied occupation, a Turkish nationalist movement rose in Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal (later called Atatürk), a veteran commander from Gallipoli, emerged as its leader. In May 1919 he landed in Samsun and began organizing resistance. Over the next years, Turkish forces fought against occupying Greeks in the west, French and Italians in the south, and Armenians in the east. This struggle (1919–1922) became known as the Turkish War of Independence. It had both military and political dimensions: in Ankara a new parliament (the Grand National Assembly) formed in 1920, rejecting the old Ottoman government in Istanbul. By mid-1922 the nationalists had expelled Greek troops from Anatolia and forced the other Europeans out through negotiation. On November 1, 1922 the sultanate was abolished entirely – the last Ottoman sultan was deposed.
Victory on the battlefield rendered the punitive Treaty of Sèvres moot. The Ankara government negotiated a new peace: the Treaty of Lausanne, signed July 24, 1923. This treaty is the cornerstone of modern Turkey’s borders. It recognized Turkey’s full sovereignty over Anatolia and East Thrace, while annulling Greek claims in Asia (and the proposed Armenian state). Crucially, Lausanne mandated a population exchange: most Anatolian Greeks were moved to Greece and Muslims in Greece to Turkey. It settled the boundaries of the new Republic of Turkey almost as we know them today. In short, Lausanne restored territory to Turkish control and abolished the capitulations and foreign spheres of influence that had eroded Ottoman independence. The Ottoman Empire had finally given way to a nation-state.
With sovereignty secured by Lausanne, on October 29, 1923 Mustafa Kemal formally proclaimed the Republic of Turkey. A new constitution was adopted, and Ankara (in the interior) replaced Istanbul as the capital. The caliphate (Ottoman sultan’s religious title) was abolished in 1924. Mustafa Kemal became the Republic’s first president and was soon given the honorific surname Atatürk (“Father of the Turks”) by the legislature. In the words of historians, Atatürk had “led the resistance in Anatolia and succeeded in having Turkey’s sovereignty recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923)”; as a result “he became the Republic’s first president”. In effect, the Republic was a revolution by the nationalist leaders of 1919–1922, and Atatürk was its architect and symbol.
Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938) was born in Salonika (now Thessaloniki, Greece), then part of the Ottoman Empire. He trained as a military officer and served with distinction in World War I (notably at the Battle of Gallipoli, 1915, where he stopped the Allied landings). After the war he returned to Anatolia to organize the nationalists. By 1923 his leadership had made him a revered figure. His surname Atatürk, granted by law in 1934, reflects how he was universally celebrated within Turkey. He was an energetic and authoritarian leader, noted for his shrewdness and for setting an uncompromising vision for the nation.
Atatürk immediately set about transforming Turkish society. He instituted what came to be known as Kemalism, often summarized by its “Six Arrows”: Republicanism, Nationalism (Turkish identity), Populism (power of the people), Etatism (state-led development), Secularism, and Reformism (permanent change). His government seized on secularist and modernist ideas. Within a few years they abolished Sharia law courts and replaced them with secular European-style civil, criminal, and commercial codes. In 1928 the Ottoman Arabic alphabet was replaced by a new Latin-based Turkish alphabet, vastly increasing literacy and turning a page on the empire’s Ottoman past. Western-style surnames and dress codes were encouraged (and Ottoman fezes were banned). Importantly, women’s status was radically elevated: Atatürk granted women full civil and political rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election (granted in 1934). He also invested in public education, built railways, and focused on industrialization. All this was done in a one-party state, top-down manner. The pace of change was breathtaking: Europe’s world changed the Ottoman Middle East in just fifteen years.
Atatürk’s ideology can be seen in six main policies. Republicanism ended monarchy and established elected government (though it was initially one-party). Nationalism promoted a unified Turkish identity over ethnic or religious divisions. Populism meant empowerment of the people, but paradoxically required strong leadership to implement reforms quickly. Etatism (state intervention in economy) guided new factories, railroads and banks to spur development. Secularism (laiklik) was perhaps the most dramatic: the caliphate was abolished and religious courts, schools and confraternities were closed or subordinated to the state. Reformism (Revolutionism) signified continuous progress: Atatürk said that to build the future, Turkey could not be chained to its Ottoman past. Together these policies reshaped Turkey’s public sphere: the military and civil institutions reflected Western models, and religious authorities had no political power.
Cultural and social reforms were especially visible. Turkish families began using surnames, adopting Western fashions and calendar, and engaging in civic life. Education was secularized and made free and compulsory. Women attended universities and entered the workforce. By the late 1930s, Istanbul had wide boulevards, theaters, and cafes not unlike those of European capitals. The Republic’s new ideology was patriotic and secular: “Turk, behave as an intelligent citizen of a modern country,” Atatürk reportedly said.
In Turkey, Atatürk is lionized as the nation’s founder. He is still often called Ulu Önder (“Great Leader”) and statues and portraits of him are common. Many Turks credit him with saving the country and building a modern, progressive state. At the same time, outsiders often note the authoritarian nature of his rule. In fact, historians observe that Atatürk twice encouraged genuine opposition parties, but both attempts failed to take root. For example, in 1924 he sanctioned a free press and even the existence of a rival party, but the new parties quickly faced bans under charges of fomenting sedition. The fact is, Atatürk consolidated power through the Republican People’s Party (CHP) without room for real political dissent. His critics argue that he overrode religious and cultural traditions harshly in the name of “progress.” Thus, while many view him as a visionary hero, others call him a benevolent dictator. Both views reflect parts of the truth: Atatürk did revolutionize Turkey and achieve social progress, but he did it by forceful, top-down means.
Overall, Atatürk’s legacy is complex. He set Turkey on a Western-oriented, secular path that endures to this day, yet his methods left no space for alternative voices. In 1923–1938 he was both the indispensable father of the nation and the uncontested ruler. Understanding modern Turkey means understanding this paradox: Atatürk is both admired as a nation-builder and scrutinized as an authoritarian. The country’s laws still honor his memory (denying his title is even a crime), but scholars emphasize that his achievements came with the price of single-party rule.
After Atatürk’s death in 1938, Turkey’s new leader İsmet İnönü kept the country out of World War II. He judged that entering the war would risk destruction, given Turkey’s recent history. Thus, Turkey remained officially neutral for most of the war, maintaining relations with both sides. In February 1945 – only after the war’s outcome was clear – Turkey declared war on Germany (symbolically) so it could join the United Nations as a founding member. This cautious strategy spared Turkey the devastation of the war and allowed it to recover relatively unscathed.
In the early Cold War period, Turkey firmly aligned with the West, joining NATO in 1952. American military aid and integration into Western defense structures marked its strategy against Soviet threats. Meanwhile domestically Turkey transitioned to multi-party democracy (from İnönü onward) and experienced economic growth and turmoil. However, the Turkish army repeatedly intervened. The generals saw themselves as guardians of the secular Atatürk legacy. They launched direct coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980 whenever politics became chaotic or Islamist movements threatened secularism. Each coup overthrew the civilian government and ushered in military administrations or forced constitutional changes. In 1997 the army again ousted a moderate Islamist prime minister in what was called a “postmodern coup.” As one report notes, “Turkey’s military has intervened directly in politics three times” and staged a softer intervention in 1997. (The last outright coup was in 1980.) These actions reflect a unique feature of modern Turkey: the military’s self-appointed role as an ideological “super-check” on government.
Another major issue in modern Turkey is the Kurdish question. Turkey has a large Kurdish minority (perhaps 15–20% of the population), mainly in the southeast. Early republican policy discouraged any separate identity, emphasizing “Turkishness.” Armed conflict with Kurdish militants began in earnest in 1984, when the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), led by Abdullah Öcalan, launched an insurgency demanding Kurdish rights or autonomy. This protracted war (PKK versus Turkish state) has cost tens of thousands of lives. (The Turkish government estimates around 40,000 total killed by 2015.) In recent decades Turkey has oscillated between military offensives against the PKK and limited peace talks. The roots of the conflict lie in ethnic and cultural grievances: for decades the Kurdish language and identity were suppressed, leading to resentment. While not all Kurds support separatism, the PKK conflict has become a major security and humanitarian issue in Turkey. Despite sporadic ceasefires, the fighting has flared up periodically into the present.
The island of Cyprus provides another long-standing flashpoint. In 1960, Cyprus gained independence from Britain with a constitution balancing Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. But tensions continued. In July 1974 a Greek nationalist coup attempted to unite (Enosis) Cyprus with Greece. Turkey, acting as guarantor power for Turkish Cypriots, sent its army on July 20, 1974. Turkish forces quickly secured a beachhead around Kyrenia and advanced inland. By mid-August, Turkey controlled roughly the northern third of the island. The result was a de facto partition: a Turkish Cypriot administration in the north and a Greek Cypriot government in the south. In 1983 the north declared itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (recognized only by Turkey). The Republic of Cyprus (south) joined the EU in 2004, but its northern counterpart remains separated by a UN buffer zone. The Cyprus issue remains unresolved to this day, a source of tension between Turkey and the West.
Since 2003 the AKP (Justice and Development Party) has dominated Turkish politics under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Early in his career Erdoğan was a reformist, improving infrastructure and negotiating EU accession talks. He oversaw strong economic growth and reduced the military’s political role. However, over time his government became more authoritarian and Islamic in tone: media have been curtailed and opponents jailed, especially after a failed coup attempt in 2016. This new course has frustrated many in the European Union. Although Turkey formally applied to join the EU in 1987 and opened membership negotiations in 2005, the process has stalled. In 2018 the EU effectively froze the talks, citing democratic backsliding in Turkey. Today, EU accession seems stalled. Turkey remains in a kind of limbo: it is a critical NATO ally on Europe’s southeastern flank, yet its bid to become an EU member is uncertain. Many Turks still favor EU membership, but equally many Europeans worry Turkey’s strategic and political changes, as well as the unresolved Cyprus division, make joining difficult.
To summarize, the land now called Turkey has one of the world’s most layered histories. It was home to some of humanity’s first temples and cities, then gave rise to Bronze Age empires (Hittite) and Iron Age kingdoms (Lydia). It was Roman and Byzantine for 1,700 years, during which Christianity flourished. From the 11th century the Turkic peoples added new chapters: the Seljuks Turkified the countryside, and then the Ottomans built a Mediterranean-spanning Islamic empire. The collapse of that empire after 1918 did not end Turkey’s story but transformed it: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk fused the Ottoman legacy and the Anatolian legacy into a secular nation-state. Modern Turkey carries all these layers within it. Today’s Turkey is neither purely “Western” nor purely “Eastern”; its history straddles both. Standing at the meeting point of Europe and Asia, Turkey remains a nation born of humanity’s long history, still shaping its future from those deep roots.
What is a simple timeline of Turkish history? A brief timeline of Turkey’s history might include:
What was Turkey called before it was Turkey? Before 1923, the name “Turkey” was not used for Anatolia. In the Ottoman era, the land was simply provinces of the empire or referred to as the lands of Rûm (Romans) or the Ottoman domains. Geographically, people called it Anatolia or Asia Minor. In antiquity it was part of Byzantium (Eastern Roman Empire) or earlier Roman provinces. There was never a single national name for the whole region before the modern state. The Turkish Republic chose the name Türkiye to signal a new national identity.
Is Turkish history superior to Western history? The question of “superiority” is not meaningful in an objective sense. Every region’s history is unique and important in its own right. Turkish/Anatolian history is as rich and consequential as European history – but not “superior.” In fact, they are interwoven. Greek, Roman and Byzantine history is part of Turkey’s land. Likewise Ottoman and modern Turkish history had major effects on Europe and Asia. It is best to appreciate each culture’s history on its own merits. Turkey’s story is distinct: its past connects East and West and contributes to both worlds. No history is inherently superior; they simply tell different chapters of humanity’s story.